After campaign polls put their support as high as 31%, the Liberal Democrats 1 failed to increase their electoral vote share and seats in Westminster substantively on election day 2010 (BBC 2010b We provide a background to the 2010 election, including the first-ever leaders' debates broadcasts. We then review explanations for the gap between the Lib Dems' buoyant preelection support and their disappointing electoral performance. The second section explains our data and methods of analysis and the findings from our narrative and discourse analyses, highlighting participants' vote calculus. Finally, we triangulate our findings with the current attempts to explain the failure of Cleggmania. This research follows up on Helena Catt's (1996) challenge to the 'orthodoxy of British electoral research' and demonstrates that qualitative electoral data can provide invaluable insights into voting behaviour by questioning the assumptions and inferences made by experts and academics on why ordinary people vote as they do and shedding new light on the effect of partisanship and contextual factors such as constituency dynamics on vote choice. We conclude that research into QESB participants'
narratives reveal a complex calculus in vote choice that has not been recognized or examined adequately by quantitative electoral analysis. We recommend the use of qualitative research, in particular to better understand how voters think about their votes given their constituency dynamics.
Setting the scene: the campaign and debates
The election saw the first televised debates between the three major party leaders in Britain. 4 David Cameron was expected to win in the debates given his background in public relations and greater ease in front of the camera in comparison with Gordon Brown. Nick Clegg was the relatively-unknown leader of the Liberal Democrats with his rhetoric of 'change' aimed at a populace disenchanted with British politics and politicians (BBC, 2010a; Blitz, 2010;  4 Each debate focused on specific themes in the first half -domestic affairs, foreign policy and the economyand general issues in the second. The leaders responded to questions and also to each other, and a moderator chaired the proceedings. There was significant anticipation for the 'Prime Ministerial' debates, one held each week in the three weeks preceding polling day (Allen et al, 2011) . For the history of the leaders' debates and televised debates, see inter alia Hook and Hitchens, 2010. Greenslade, 2010; The Telegraph, 2010 (Populus, 2010; YouGov, 2010) . However, Clegg's obscurity vanished overnight. The morning after the first debate the London media was dominated by the neologism 'Cleggmania' (inter alia : Hasan, 2010; Mayer, 2010; Sabloff, 2010) .
Turning point: Cleggmania
Approximately 9.7 million people watched the first debate (Wring and Ward, 2010) . Clegg had a strong first debate. His 'polished performance' helped him connect with voters unfamiliar with him and he positioned his party as a 'viable alternative to the "old parties"' (Quinn and Clements, 2011: 82; Wring, 2011: 2) . Clegg's criticisms of the two major parties struck a positive chord with the respondents polled by Ipsos MORI (Allen et al, 2011: 189) .
He came across as trustworthy and the leader who gave the least evasive answers (Lawes and 5 In a survey taken before the first debate around 44% believed David Cameron would perform best in the debates (only 13% predicted that of Nick Clegg) (Curtice, 2010) . 6 For a view of the role of hung parliaments in Britain before the 2010 coalition government see Kalitowski (2008) . Hawkins, 2011: 68-70) . QESB focus groups were conducted before and after each of the three debates. The transcripts captured QESB participants' reactions in real time.
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Participants reported positive reactions to Clegg's precision in answering the questions and his polished first debate performance. Excerpt 1 contains the real-time reactions that we identify as driving 'Cleggmania' (Winters, 2011) .
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Excerpt 1 9 David: I felt the two people who had more gravitas were Gordon Brown and Cameron yet Nick Clegg seemed to have all the answers. He knew how he was going to pay things off. You know they were talking about deficits, this, that, and the other. They seemed to have worked out the budget, how they were going to afford this whereas Labour and Conservative weren't disclosing that.
(Later) Patricia: Actually I was really surprised about Nick Clegg. I thought he was the one who actually answered the questions more than anyone else did. He actually positively
came out with what he was going to do, the numbers etc., whereas Cameron, really I was really looking forward to hearing him and he really disappointed me. I was very surprised.
Jane: I'm glad you said that 'cause that was something I had forgotten but yes, he
[Clegg] was definitely much more focused on the person who had asked the question and the question they had actually asked rather than just using it as an excuse to kind of say 'ah, this is lovely but let me talk about health reform.'….
7 Participants did not watch post-debate coverage; therefore, we are confident their reactions are free from media effects. QESB transcripts are available at: Winters, 2011. 8 Most participants were undecided at the time of the debate. 9 Participant details are anonymised. Conventions used: ** inaudible words, italic font word guessed at, curly brackets {} sounds (e.g. laughter), and parentheses () breaks in time.
Clegg transformed the Lib Dems into serious contenders in the eyes of the major parties, the media and potential voters. 10 Lib Dem support rose from 17% to 31% (Lawes and Hawkins, 2011: 68) and there was speculation that they might overtake Labour as the main opposition party (Deacon and Wring, 2011: 287) . This unprecedented boost was called the 'Clegg effect' or 'Cleggmania'. It increased expectations for the Lib Dems' electoral performance, presuming that the sections of the electorate enthused by the campaign would vote for them in unexpectedly large numbers (Allen et al, 2011: 197 (Allen et al, 2011: 189-93 ). Clegg's third debate performance was seen as repetitive and 'tired' and Cameron was judged the winner by a small but distinct margin (ibid: 195) . By the end of the campaign nine British Polling Council (BPC) polls reported that 26-29% of respondents stated a Lib Dem vote preference (Atkinson and Mortimore, 2011: 78) .
The dilemma: Why did Cleggmania fail to convert support to votes?
The election results were disappointing for the Lib Dems; they won 23% of the vote, one point better than their 2005 share (ibid). The BPC polls (excluding the three internet surveys)
had overestimated the party's vote share by an average of 3.6% points (Kellner et al, 2011: 95 (Allen et al, 2011; Johnston and Pattie, 2011a A third account focuses on a lack of persuadable voters. Lawes and Hawkins (2011: 66-68) argue the initial Lib Dem surge was rooted in an unstable coalition of respondents whose allegiance the party was unable to widen or consolidate. ComRes polls that tracked party support and voter preferences showed that although expressed voting intention for the Lib Dems rose from 21% before the first leaders' debate to 27% before the third one, the party was unable to capture the increased bastions of support or retain them after the first debate.
Analysis of party support by pre-debate voting intention showed that over three-fourths of respondents who expressed allegiance to specific parties continued to support them after each debate. Additional support for the Lib Dems came largely from the remaining one-fourth of supporters of the two major parties and a third of supporters of smaller parties. Similarly Allen et al (2011: 198) suggest that most voters would have decided their vote choice before watching the debates and Cleggmania could plausibly have affected only a small section of voters. 11 They suggest the apparent first debate surge could 'well have been an artefact of media-priming effects and the tendency for people to say they would vote for the party whose leader they had been told had won the debate'. The Lib Dems received the same three-to four-point campaign bounce in 2010 as they had in general election campaigns since 1997 (ibid). By this account, the leaders' debates and campaign had no greater or lesser effect on Lib Dem support than prior campaigns.
Justification: Our data and methods

Several of the above accounts rely upon the inferences of experts or academics' assumptions
of what voters perceived or intended. 12 Our approach to the Cleggmania puzzle uses evidence other accounts do not incorporate: the perceptions and self-reports of voters themselves. This allows both the cognitive and affective aspects of vote choice, often described in the values and norms of partisan identification, to emerge from the data. Partisan identification, as summarized by Burden (2008) , is a combination of 'affect and cognition ' (p. 60 ). This combines the Stokes' (1969, 1974) view that partisan identification represents an affective bond between voters and parties with research that highlighted the cognitive component of partisan identification (Key, 1966; Fiorina, 1977; Lodge and Hamill, 1986) .
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The use of pre-and post-election focus group data is unique in the extant British vote choice literature. Our approach has implications for the hypothesized effects of 'voter characteristics' on the cost-benefit calculations of vote choice and the propensity for voters to vote sincerely 11 In 2010, 43% of respondents reported making up their minds during the campaign, higher than the reported figure for the 2005 election. For voters interested in the debates, Allen et al (2011: 198) 1996: 32-33) . 13 See also Campbell et al for a view of partisan identification as 'the individual's affective orientation to an important group-object in his environment, ' (1960, p. 121). or strategically (Kedar, 2012: 551-552 'how people use language in their everyday interactions, their 'discourses' with each other, and how they…put their linguistic skills to use in building specific accounts of events' (Burr, 2003: 17) . We examined the post-election transcripts from focus groups conducted between 18 and 24 May 2010 in England (Essex and London), Scotland (Glasgow) and Wales (Aberystwyth) for participants' vote choice stories and related asides. 14 During the focus groups participants were invited to recount the lead up to election day and if, and for whom they voted. 15 Focus groups are not as in-depth as one-on-one interviews but they facilitate the gathering of rich data from many people (in this case 30 voters from across Britain). 16 Such data lends itself to thematic organization and we applied narrative analysis and discourse analysis to the stories, respectively.
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We believe that the data produced through the QESB is methodologically valid (i.e. our data and findings represent something in the world accurately). Our working assumption for this research was that participants knew how they had voted and they would construct their stories both to recount and to explain (justify) their actions. Our analysis makes visible the narrative structure of people's stories and the values, norms, or ideas they cited; the analysis aggregates these factors to see how they interact. The analysis is not vertical (insights into one person), but rather horizontal (norms and values common across people). We seek, not to capture one participant's vote choice thought process perfectly, but rather the common values and norms
Britons draw upon to communicate their vote choice. An analogy could be, if someone were to relate a poker game story, he might not convey all the details perfectly but his account will reflect the accepted rules and values of the game. Which parts he focuses on -bluffing, tells, 'upping the ante' -reveals how he understands the game. If he relates something in contradiction to that discourse he will appear to others to not understand how poker is played.
Given this, we propose two possible approaches to this data: a charitable view and a sceptical view. The charitable view, which we adhere to, would see these data as more or less reflecting participants' sincerely held views, stipulating both social desirability and people's tendency for cognitive consistency (Festinger, 1957) . 18 A sceptical view would see the data as constructed accounts that do not accurately reflect people's prior thought-processes or views.
In both cases, the narratives remain attempts to communicate one's attitudes and actions in a way others would find rational and convincing (even if that person voted for a different party). Even taking up a sceptical view of these narratives, it must still be acknowledged that the participants drew upon the shared political norms and values of British democracy in their accounts. Our analysis, therefore, was constructed to find the broader patterns in the values and norms across stories of participants within different constituency dynamics, holding different partisan identifications, and from three nations.
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In the first wave of analyzing the post-election transcripts, we did a close reading of each vote choice story using narrative analysis. Narrative analysis is a holistic approach that preserves the context and particularity of the data (Riessman, 1993) . Stories have a narrative order that describe a tension or an unexpected event that requires reaction and/or adjustment (Riessman, 2008) . 20 People's stories draw upon their subjective experiences and provide insights into their concepts of identity and self (Smith, 2000) . Narrative analysis examines how the storyteller interprets things (Bruner, 1990) . The QESB vote choice stories contained elements of the dramatic arc and plus additional ones. 21 We identified the following narrative elements: We re-read the transcripts to identify the temporal ordering of events and logical coherence in 30 vote choice stories and identified elements within each, for example:
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Original text:
20 Franzosi (1998: 521) notes '[T]he temporal ordering of events in a story is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the emergence of a story. The events in the sequence must be bound together by some principles of logical coherence'. 21 Introduction/Exposition -main characters and scene are set; Inciting incident -problem or conflict is introduced; Rising Action -intensity increases; Climax -Turning point, the situations changes; Falling actiondifficulties are confronted and overcome; Resolution/Denouement -remaining issues are reconciled (MacEwan, 1900; Ohler, 2008 In vivo codes use the language of respondents to preserve a particular meaning and/or the significance in a setting (Gibbs and Taylor, 2010 ).
As we were interested in what the tellers were communicating the narratives were examined for patterns in the story structures and value themes. 24 In this fourth wave of data analysis distinct themes emerged: pre-election vote choice dilemmas (yes or no) and post-election explanations that included partisanship or not. Using a deductive approach this becomes a 2 x 2 pre-election dilemma and post-election partisanship frame (Table 1) . 25 Four types emerged from inductive analysis but not in the categories deductive reasoning would predict. 
Dated Nick, didn't stick
Five voters, two prior Labour voters and three Conservative voters, were undecided at the preelection focus groups. They considered voting Lib Dem, but ultimately voted for their usual party. We provide excerpts and the narrative structures.
Excerpt 3
Roger (Labour): 31 There's elements of my situation which mirror the same sort of pattern in that it was a decision between Labour and the Liberal Party and as a longterm Labour voter I wasn't used to having to face a decision on that course so much…. thought-they're never going to get in. So I waited for my husband to get home, we both went and I still wasn't sure, and we got there and the Tory guys were outside, so I walked up and put my cross straight away, and -Tories. In the end, yeah I thought I don't think they're going to do it so I'll just vote Tory. or 'shy Tories' that has been used to account for why pollsters got the results of the 1992 general election wrong (see Jowell et al, 1993) . Survey research has explained the reason for the polls misjudging Tory support as a failure on the part of voters who went for the Conservative party in that election to reveal their true vote preference to the pollsters.
However, our analysis of Cleggmania suggests that these voters could have given sincere preferences at the time and then behaved differently on polling day.
Next we take up the two types of vote choice narratives that emerged from participants who had a pre-election dilemma but did not give a partisanship explanation for their Lib Dem vote.
These people were either 'won over' to the Lib Dems or had strategic considerations.
3a. Won over
The 'Won Over' voters' narratives mirror 'Dated Nick' voters except in their justifications.
'Won Over' voters do not report the cognitive dissonance dilemmas seen above. Instead they cite their agreement with Lib Dem principles and/or being impressed with Nick Clegg. Two participants mention the debates as turning points in their decision-making; two others cite constituency dynamics. Worries about casting a wasted vote or their vote not meaning much also featured in these stories. These voters were 'won over' in that something overcame their 'wasted vote' concerns to vote Lib Dem.
Excerpt 4
Nicole: 35 I still hadn't really decided until I turned up at the polling station, but I voted for the Liberal Democrats and I live in a very, very safe Tory seat. So I really knew my vote wasn't going to mean very much but I agree with their principles, I like the candidate I just wanted to show my support and just place the vote where I wanted it even though I knew it wouldn't do anything.
Diane: 36 I didn't know who I was going to vote for. I liked the Lib Dems and thoughtis it going to be a wasted vote? Then I saw the debate, which was here, and that made up my mind really who I did want to vote for which was Lib Dem. We conclude that the debates and Cleggmania shored up support with these wavering and leaning voters. That the Lib Dems increased their 2010 vote share by one point may be down to Cleggmania converting such wavering and leaning supporters into votes.
3b. Strategic voters
'Strategic' voters are unique in that these voters consider the costs and benefits given their constituency dynamics. Their structured stories assume the norm of voting as an act that maximizes their personal views or a politically preferable outcome. 37 Johnston and Pattie (2011b) examined 2010 BES data for tactical voting given local contexts. They conclude (in part) that people voted tactically if their preferred party attachments were relatively weak, if they had confidence in their second-preference party, and where they thought it could win.
Our findings map onto some of their conclusions, but provide richer voting calculus data rather than inferences drawn from statistical patterns. 38 Our analysis revealed multiple motivations for the same act of tactical voting and we feel an important contribution is its differentiation between three types of strategic voters: 1) tactical: voted Lib Dem to stop another party from winning, 2) satisficing: preferred a marginal party, but voted Lib Dem to support a viable and still political proximal party, and 3) principle/policy: express support for electoral reform or a policy (usually proportional representation).The first two fit neatly into the quantitative conclusion of Johnston and Pattie (2011b) , the third does not. want to get a 3-party system going… I didn't vote for a short-term government I voted for a chance of some sort of ideal.' 43 Peter also indicated he valued a systemic change: '…what concerned me and had concerned me for a long time is, the unfairness of the system, we have this two-party system.' 44 Lyle too, speaks of his long-term perspective on the use of his vote:
'I thought the Lib-Dems would have a better chance of having a long-term impact… even though you shouldn't vote strategically I think that by voting for the Liberal Democrats, at least in the future you won't possibly have to vote strategically.' 45 We would argue there is a qualitative difference between voting as an expression of values at that moment and seeing one's vote as a movement in a larger political plan to bring about institutional change. Our understanding is this is a distinct set of values based in strategic goal-seeking that contrasts
with expressive values of partisan post-election or 'Won Over' voters' justifications.
Reflections and Coda
The televised leaders' debates debuted to fanfare and, by most accounts, provided a public platform for the 'third party' to introduce its policies and leader to the British public. The hype surrounding Cleggmania reached unprecedented heights following the first debate (Lawes and Hawkins, 2011: 68) . The failure of the Lib Dems to transform their electoral prospects into electoral success left many people befuddled. The QESB transcripts and our analysis shed new light on this puzzle by illuminating how Cleggmania operated in the thoughts and calculations of ordinary voters.
As to the validity of our findings we seek to meet the criteria of Riessman (1993: 65-8) in terms of persuasiveness -the data and our analysis are persuasive; correspondence -the theories we produce match the data; and usefulness -our findings can be useful to future research. Further, we can triangulate our conclusions to augment the other accounts of Cleggmania's failure. The first explanation was a survey-based account of why Cleggmania failed to produce expected results: 'the polls got it wrong' either because they measured support that did not exist or failed to measure a decline in support (Atkinson and Mortimore, 2011: 78) . Our results provide insight into the psychological obstacle of voting for another party given a previous partisan identification. Our evidence-based account suggests there were people who considered voting Lib Dem but when faced with the ballot found it difficult to vote against their traditional party. A portion of the 3.6% error in the pre-election polls may have been down to people honestly reporting a Lib Dem vote intention in a survey but then did not (or could not) follow through in the voting booth. The psychological elements of voting may also explain why voters who didn't profess a vote preference for the Tories in the 1992 general election ended up voting for them. Contrary to accepted explanations that these voters were 'shy' or 'silent' about expressing who they would vote for, our analysis of 'dated Nick' voters suggests that long-term partisans who sincerely profess an undecided status or who lean toward a different party in a survey cannot be assumed to follow through on that declaration when faced with casting their ballot, either by not voting or voting for another party.
The next account in the literature cited an over-emphasis on the effect of the leaders' debates by the media while ignoring the limited number of viable seats Lib Dems could win (Allen et al, 2011; Johnston and Pattie, 2011a; Lawes and Hawkins, 2011) . We found extensive evidence that constituency dynamics played an important role in people's vote decision. Of the 30 vote stories we analyzed, 17 include constituency dynamics in the narrative. The evidence provides rich, context-informed insight into constituency considerations, such as where parties are concentrated or the number of marginal seats 'in play' (Atkinson and Mortimore, 2011; Johnston and Pattie, 2011a) . QESB participants detail how they made decisions within the confines of their own constituency dynamics. For instance, those who expressed a strong partisanship were unlikely to mention 'wasted' votes. The vote choice stories that most often contextualized constituency dynamics and/or cited concerns about a wasted vote were those of Lib Dem voters. These complex and constrained calculations cannot be captured by a one-size-fits-all vote choice model using survey data. We recommend that future qualitative research projects be undertaken to better understand constituency level dynamics and its impact on the voting calculus.
The last account cited a lack of persuadable voters available to the Lib Dems. Lawes and Hawkins (2011: 66-8) argued the initial Lib Dem surge was rooted in an unstable coalition of respondents whose allegiance the party was unable to widen or consolidate. Our analyses identified several participants for whom the debates and Cleggmania shored up their wavering support and converted them into 'won over' voters. Lawes and Hawkins (ibid) also described support for the Lib Dems as coming from supporters of each of the two major parties and supporters from smaller parties. We add to this account by identifying the vote choice stories of strategic, satisficing, and principle/policy voters who saw a vote for the Lib Dems as a way to maximize their utility on a personal level. Further, we saw the Lib Dems unable to convince long-time Labour and Conservative participants to abandon their party identification at the ballot box.
Our analysis also provides a response to a hypothesis proposed by Kedar (2012: 551-2) concerning the factors that affect strategic voting and this has implications for measuring tactical voting in the British Election Study. We find evidence in support of the proposition that partisans are less likely to vote strategically. However, our analysis of the 'Stayed loyal' 
